The US president had previously pledged to “help” anti-government protesters amid unrest in the Islamic Republic
President Donald Trump is weighing the possibility of ordering new strikes against Iran in response to the government’s crackdown on protests and riots triggered by soaring inflation, the New York Times reported on Saturday, citing US officials familiar with the discussions.
According to the newspaper, Trump has been briefed in recent days on several attack options, including strikes on non-military targets in Tehran, but has not made a final decision. The president has issued multiple threats against Iran in the past and publicly voiced support for protesters on Saturday.
“Iran is looking at FREEDOM, perhaps like never before. The USA stands ready to help!!!” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform.
The protests erupted in Iran on December 28 after the collapse of the national currency led to sharp increases in the price of food and other staple goods. Demonstrations quickly escalated into widespread unrest, with rioters clashing with police and attacking government institutions in Tehran and other cities. Authorities cut internet and phone connections nationwide on Thursday in an effort to contain the violence.
Iran accused the US and Israel of fueling the unrest. “Believing that the Islamic Republic of Iran is like other countries, the US is pursuing the same measures by encouraging certain individuals to create chaos and riots,” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote on X on Saturday.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei denounced the threats as “baseless,” saying the country “will not back down against vandals.”
The US carried out strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025 in support of Israel’s 12-day air campaign against the country. Iran responded with a missile barrage targeting a US base in Qatar, causing no casualties.
Peter Szijjarto denounces plans to deploy Western troops in Ukraine as “war fanaticism”
Britain and France are risking dragging Europe into an all-out war with Russia, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto has said, condemning plans to deploy Western troops in Ukraine.
On Tuesday, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a declaration of intent with Ukraine to establish “military hubs” in the country after a peace deal with Moscow. UK Defense Secretary John Healey later said during a visit to Kiev that London would spend $270 million on equipping units ready to become part of a “multinational force.”
Hungary has consistently opposed further escalation with Russia and has urged the EU to focus on diplomacy. Speaking at a congress of the ruling conservative Fidesz party on Saturday, Szijjarto said the “war fanaticism” of Western European leaders was “throwing Hungary into the greatest danger.”
“Last weekend, a statement was released in Paris announcing the two European nuclear powers’ decision to send their troops to Ukraine. Essentially, this means that the European nuclear powers are starting a war. Their goal, let us be clear, is to engulf all of Europe in flames,” the diplomat said.
Szijjarto argued that the EU viewed Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban as “the only obstacle” to its plans and was seeking to replace him with a pro-Ukrainian leader in parliamentary elections scheduled for April.
“If we win the election, we will stay out of the war,” he said. “If we do not win, then the Brussels–Kiev plan will be implemented.”
Under the plan outlined in Paris, Britain and France would deploy troops to help build protected weapons facilities and take part in US-led truce monitoring. The US has ruled out sending its own soldiers to Ukraine.
On Thursday, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova warned that Moscow would treat any Western troops or military sites in Ukraine as “a foreign intervention” posing a threat to its security. Russia has listed Ukrainian neutrality, including no foreign troops on the ground, as one of its key conditions for a lasting peace.
The president said Washington wants to control Caracas’ petroleum production and trade
US President Donald Trump has signed an executive order blocking courts and creditors from laying claim to Venezuelan oil sales revenue held in US Treasury accounts.
The White House said on Friday that the move constitutes a “national emergency” aimed at preserving the funds to “advance US foreign policy objectives” in the region.
Trump said US companies would gain access to oil production in Venezuela, whose president, Nicolas Maduro, was abducted along with his wife during a US commando raid on a compound in Caracas last week.
Venezuela has condemned the operation as a gross violation of its sovereignty.
The order “blocks any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process” against Venezuelan oil and diluent sales revenue held by the Treasury, the White House said. It added that losing control over the funds would “empower malign actors like Iran and Hezbollah” and “directly jeopardize US objectives.”
Trump, who met with US oil executives on Friday, said the companies would invest at least $100 billion in Venezuela’s oil production. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said earlier that Washington plans to sell Venezuelan oil “indefinitely.”
Exxon CEO Darren Woods said, however, that socialist-run Venezuela was “uninvestable” without comprehensive reforms in its energy sector.
US oil companies have longstanding claims dating back to the 2000s nationalization of oil production under Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chavez. Trump cited the “unfair” seizure of American corporate assets as one of the reasons behind the raid against Maduro.
Delcy Rodriguez, a close Maduro ally sworn in as acting president in his absence, said the oil-rich country was open to “beneficial” projects with any nation, including the US. Venezuelan officials said, however, that they would not allow Washington to “steal” its resources.
At least four people were injured in an attack on the city of Voronezh, a regional governor has said
Ukrainian kamikaze drones have struck apartment blocks in Russia’s Voronezh, about 500 km south of Moscow, injuring at least four people, according to regional authorities.
Voronezh Region Governor Aleksandr Gusev said on his Telegram channel on Sunday that seven high-rise residential buildings and six smaller houses were damaged in the attack. Four people were hospitalized, he added.
Gusev also stated that 17 drones were intercepted by air defenses and electronic jamming systems.
Several Telegram news channels reported that residents heard more than 30 explosions in the sky over the city.
On Friday, Ukraine carried out a rocket attack on Russia’s Belgorod region, leaving nearly 560,000 people without power and many without heat and water. Power has since been partially restored, Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov said on Saturday.
The Israeli prime minister is the “worst criminal of humanity,” the Pakistani defense minister has claimed
Washington should order its military to capture Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and “prosecute him in any of its courts,” Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif has declared.
He condemned the US operation in Venezuela and describing the capture of President Nicolas Maduro as a kidnapping, but said such an action would be justified if carried out against Israel.
After the raid a week ago, the US government charged Maduro with narcotics trafficking, allegations he has consistently denied, saying Washington’s actions are aimed at seizing his country’s natural resources rather than upholding the law.
The US actions “opened a Pandora’s box” by giving legitimacy to an approach that was “highly controversial” in the past, Asif told Pakistani broadcaster Geo TV in an interview aired earlier this week. “The world order is collapsing,” the defense minister warned, adding that what Washington did was “not a good thing to do.”
If there was one person in the world who deserved such treatment, that would be Netanyahu, Asif clarified, calling the Israeli leader “the worst criminal of humanity” and pointing to the operation in Gaza.
“America should kidnap him and taking him away and prosecute him in any of its courts, if America is a friend of humanity,” Asif said. Alternatively, he suggested that Türkiye could do it and that Pakistan would “pray” for such an outcome.
Israel’s image has been badly damaged by the conflict in Gaza, prompted by an October 2023 surprise attack on the south of the country launched by the Palestinian militant group Hamas, which left 1,200 dead. West Jerusalem responded with heavy bombardment and ground operations in the Palestinian enclave, which claimed the lives of 70,000 Palestinians, according to the local health authorities. The campaign also led to the International Criminal Court (ICC) issuing arrest warrants for Netanyahu and then Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for alleged war crimes.
Washington slammed the ICC decision and imposed sanctions against the prosecutors who sought the warrant against Netanyahu and Gallant.
Bloc members have lost approximately 65% of their revenue in exports to Russia since 2022
EU nations have lost around €48 billion ($55.9 billion) in exports over the past four years since the imposition of anti-Russian sanctions, according to Eurostat data.
The bloc and the wider West imposed an unprecedented wave of sanctions on Moscow following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022, aiming to collapse the Russian economy – which instead led to its adaptation and strengthening, according to Russian authorities.
The EU made €25 billion from exports to Russia between January and October of 2025, compared to €73 billion for the same period in 2021, data from the EU statistics office shows.
This amounted to approximately a 65% fall in exports.
The EU recorded a positive trade balance with Russia for two quarters in a row in late 2025, for the first time since 2002, Eurostat reported in December.
Despite the bloc’s plans to phase out Russian gas imports by 2027, Russia remained its second-largest supplier of the fuel. Its share of total EU gas purchases hit 15.1%, down from 39% in 2021.
The bloc’s gradual pivot away from affordable Russian hydrocarbons to more expensive US liquefied natural gas (LNG) has led to soaring energy prices and slowing economic growth.
On Tuesday, Russian energy giant Gazprom warned that EU nations could face gas shortages amid a sharp decline in storage levels across the bloc’s biggest hubs, like Germany and the Netherlands.
The rapid depletion of reserves will lead to a premature productivity loss and “threatens the reliable supply of gas to consumers during cold weather,” Gazprom said.
The tech billionaire has been feuding with British officials for months, accusing them of censorship and arrests over tweets
Elon Musk has accused the UK government of suppressing free speech after officials threatened to ban Grok, his X platform’s AI chatbot, over reports that it generates non-consensual erotic deepfake images of women and children.
British communications watchdog Ofcom has said that it is investigating Grok’s ability to generate sexualized images derived from photos of real people.
UK Technology Secretary Liz Kendall has said she would back Ofcom if it blocks nationwide access to the chatbot.
On Saturday, one X user pointed out that Google’s Gemini and OpenAI’s ChatGPT will also generate bikini deepfakes of people when prompted, posting two bikini snaps of British Prime Minister Keir Starmer from the two chatbots.
“They just want to suppress free speech,” Elon Musk replied.
Just a day earlier, X announced that Grok’s image generation and editing tools had been limited to paying subscribers. Musk also warned that anyone using the platform to create illegal content would face the same legal consequences as if they had uploaded it directly.
The tech billionaire has long accused Starmer of suppressing free speech and arresting people over social media posts, amid an extensive government crackdown after anti-immigration riots shook the UK last year.
Several bouts of unrest followed a mass stabbing in Southport by the son of two immigrants, and again after the sexual assault of a young girl by a migrant.
Prior to that, Musk and Starmer has already engaged in a months-long feud after the tech billionaire accused the UK prime minister of mishandling the grooming gang scandal, in which groups of mostly Pakistani men systematically raped thousands of vulnerable young British girls over two decades. In June, Starmer ordered a new inquiry into the grooming gangs following mounting pressure after the scandal’s return to the spotlight.
America’s revived Monroe Doctrine, from Venezuela to Colombia and Mexico, puts hegemony above international courts and the UN system
The US military intervention in Venezuela to kidnap President Maduro was a gross violation of the UN Charter. Nothing justifies this blatant flouting of international law. The arguments given by the US to justify its aggression do not stand up to scrutiny.
The Western Hemisphere consists of several sovereign countries that are members of the UN. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela either signed the 1942 Declaration by United nations or were among the original members which signed the UN Charter in 1945.
The UN Charter is based on the sovereign equality of nations and non-interference in their internal affairs, and must be the basis of relations between the US and Latin America.
The US has invoked the Monroe Doctrine in its National Security Strategy 2025 document to assert and legitimise its past hegemony over the Americas. A ‘Trump Corollary’ has been added to infuse the Monroe Doctrine with Trump’s thinking (much like Xi Jinping’s Thought being incorporated in the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party). By this revived imperialistic thinking, the US is repudiating the UN Charter.
By stating “This is the Western Hemisphere. This is where we live — and we’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States,” US Secretary of State Rubio is enunciating a highly contentious proposition.
Russia has parallel strategic concerns about the relentless expansion of NATO towards its borders and Europe being used as an American base of operations, concerns that the US has ignored. By this logic, China too could oppose the western Pacific becoming a US base of operations. Would the US be prepared to accept this logic?
When Rubio adds “We’ve seen how our adversaries all over the world are exploiting and extracting resources from Africa, from every other country” and claims this is not going to happen in the Western Hemisphere under Trump, he is enunciating another highly disputable proposition.
The US itself is now eyeing Africa’s critical raw materials and is developing political and investment strategies to extract them on an urgent basis. The competition is with China, so much so that the US has actually overtaken China as the biggest foreign direct investor in Africa, according to the latest annual figures.
The US has entered into agreements with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia to establish a supply chain for electric vehicles batteries, underscoring its interest in the copper, lithium and cobalt resources of the two countries. The US is building the Lobito Rail Corridor, which will transport minerals from Congo, Zambia and Angola. The political initiative taken by Trump to preside over a ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda was part of this economic strategy. The US think tanks have produced many studies focused on the US exploitation of Africa’s critical mineral resources in a major way.
Trump has announced that the US will run Venezuela. He expects the government of Delcy Rodriguez, the new president, to do his bidding, failing which he will maintain the oil embargo on Venezuela and starve it of revenues.
To enforce these illegal sanctions, the US Navy has begun to board vessels infringing the embargo, including a Russia-flagged oil tanker in the high seas in the Atlantic, which has upped the ante with Moscow. Rubio has already questioned why Venezuela needed to trade in oil with Russia, China and Iran. The logic of this position is that Venezuela should only trade in oil with the US. Washington’s new narrative is that the resources of the Western Hemisphere belong to the US.
In Trump’s plans, all Venezuelan oil will be delivered to the US for marketing and the use of the proceeds, including in Venezuela, will be decided by him. Venezuela will only be able to buy US products with this oil money. None of this has any legal basis. Trump had the gumption of declaring that he has been in touch with US oil firms before and after the invasion of Venezuela. He wants them to invest in Venezuela’s oil infrastructure, which is in poor shape at present, with the goal of exercising control over the world’s largest known oil reserves so that the US becomes the dominant player in the global oil market.
The caveat to all this is that developing Venezuela’s oil infrastructure will need billions of dollars of investment. For the US oil companies, such long term investment has to be predicated on assurance that the political environment in Venezuela will remain friendly in the years ahead. The neo-colonial and imperialistic approach of the US does not necessarily guarantee that.
Buoyed by his success in Venezuela, Trump has begun to threaten the Colombian president, whom he has described as a “sick person” and a drug trafficker to the US, the charge made against Maduro. Trump is also threatening Mexico, declaring that they “need to get their act together.”
Rubio considers the US action against Maduro legal, as he had been indicted by a US court for drug trafficking. This is not a sustainable position under international law, as it disregards the sovereign immunity of a serving Head of State. The extension of US domestic law to a foreign country also breaches international law. But the US is a recidivist in this regard, having kidnapped the leader of Panama, Manuel Noreiga, on January 3, 1990, the exact date on which Maduro was abducted in 2026.
It is a matter of deep concern to the international community that the US has begun to spurn multilateralism and reject the constraints of international law. Trump’s Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller has bluntly asserted that for the US, only strength and power matter, not international law or norms.
He claims that “We live in a world in which you can talk all you want about international niceties and everything else …But we live in a world, in the real world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.” This destructive thinking belongs to the pre-nuclear era.
The US has now announced that it is withdrawing from 66 international organizations, many of them UN-related. Important ones in the areas of climate change, energy and trade have been targeted, such as UNFCCC, IPCC, GCF, ECOSOC, UNCTAD, and the International Solar Alliance which India had taken the lead to set up along with France.
The US argument is that these institutions are redundant in their scope, mismanaged, unnecessary, wasteful, poorly run, captured by the interests of actors advancing their own agendas contrary to those of the US, or are a threat to the sovereignty, freedoms, and general prosperity of the US. This is a move away from multilateralism and the UN system in part, which may actually result in the erosion of US leadership, because the world will learn to live without the US. The US had earlier walked out of UNESCO, the WHO, the UNHRC, the Paris Climate Change Agreement, etc., but these bodies have survived.
India has expressed “deep concern” regarding the developments in Venezuela, without directly criticizing the US, keeping in mind our consistent refusal to criticize Russia regarding its special military operation in Ukraine. Russia has to assess what this US adventurism against Venezuela, which hits at Russian interests in the country, implies with regards to the understandings the two sides have tried to reach in their efforts to resolve the Ukraine conflict.
The key question is: to what extent the can the Trump administration be trusted? The report that Trump has given the green light to Senator Lindsey Graham’s Russia Sanctions Bill will be problematic for both Russia and India, and Brazil as well.
Europe has driven itself into an untenable situation by burning all bridges with Russia as a loyal ally of the US, and now the territorial threat to Europe is coming from the US.
Europe’s narrative about the danger of Russia has been blown up by Trump’s action against Venezuela and his threat to take over Greenland for national security reasons, by force if necessary. This could potentially endanger the future of NATO and the EU as well.
Now, Iran is on the boil because of street protests over the deteriorating economic conditions in the country. A regime change in Iran has been long on the agenda of the US and Israel. Trump has warned that the US is “locked and loaded” to intervene if the Iranian government moves to suppress the “peaceful” protestors.
Trump has already crossed a line in bombing Iranian nuclear sites. Another military action by him cannot be entirely ruled out. He is on record as having said that the US knows the location of Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei and he can be taken out when needed. After targeting China’s and Russia’s interests in Venezuela, it is not inconceivable that Trump may seek to do that in Iran by encouraging a regime change, even if the risks of doing this are much higher.
Trump wants to raise the US defense budget to $1.5 trillion in 2027. If his foreign policy is to be based not on respecting international law but on power equations, then in that uncharted landscape the worst can happen.
The agreement is reportedly based on a rare earths deal granting American investors preferential access to future mining projects
Washington and Kiev are preparing to sign an $800 billion agreement to rebuild Ukraine, The Telegraph has reported. The deal is scheduled to be sealed at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos later this month, Western sources told the newspaper.
The agreement is reportedly structured around the rare earth minerals deal clinched by Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky and US President Donald Trump last year. The accord grants Washington preferential access to the resources; however, the security guarantees long sought by Kiev are not included.
At the time, Trump promoted the agreement as a way to recover what he described as the massive financial aid provided to Kiev by the previous administration. Earlier this week, he reiterated that a deal on rare earth metals was a condition for the White House to continue its efforts to peacefully resolve the Ukraine conflict.
“I said that if we want to move forward, we need rare earth metals,” Trump told Fox News on Thursday. “We want our money back.”
Officials told The Telegraph that the “prosperity” plan envisages attracting around $800 billion over ten years through a combination of loans, grants and private-sector investment.
The newspaper noted that US envoy Steve Witkoff called the agreement a crucial part of the overall ceasefire package he has been negotiating for the past few months. The top state official reportedly said that the world’s largest investment group, BlackRock, would participate in the program.
Trump repeatedly criticized unconditional aid to Kiev in the past, calling Zelensky “the greatest salesman on earth.” Last year, he said his predecessor, Joe Biden, had “fleeced” America by committing $350 billion in military aid to Ukraine.
He has since argued that the US is now profiting from the conflict by sending Ukraine weapons which are being paid for by Washington’s European NATO partners. Moscow has repeatedly condemned Western arms deliveries to Kiev, arguing that they prolong the fighting without altering its outcome.
John Healey’s comments have come in the wake of the US capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro
UK Defense Secretary John Healey has said he would kidnap Russian President Vladimir Putin if given a choice out of all world leaders. The British official was answering a question from the Kiev Independent during a visit to the Ukrainian capital on Friday.
His comments came a week after the US captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife in a military raid on the oil-rich South American country. Maduro had previously warned that Washington wanted a regime change and to get its hands on Venezuelan resources.
The US actions drew strong condemnation from BRICS nations, including Russia, India, China, and Brazil, but also prompted a string of calls from Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky to adopt similar tactics against Moscow.
The Kiev Independent asked Healey what he would do “given the option of being able to kidnap any world leader.” The secretary said he would “take Putin into custody” while accusing the Russian president of “war crimes,” including the “kidnapping” of Ukrainian children – something that Russian negotiators publicly denied during talks in Istanbul last year.
London has previously emerged as one of Kiev’s key backers in its conflict with Moscow. In December, the British chief of defense staff urged the nation to be ready to switch to a wartime mindset in the event of hostilities with Russia.
Zelensky commented on the American raid by saying that “the United States knows what to do next” in a thinly veiled hint at Putin’s kidnapping. US President Donald Trump then dismissed the idea, saying it would be unnecessary when asked by journalists.
Ukraine’s leader then openly called on Washington to kidnap the head of Russia’s Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. He quickly shot back, telling Zelensky to “man up” and try it himself.
Moscow has denounced the abduction of Maduro as a gross violation of Venezuelan sovereignty. The Russian envoy to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, described the US raid as “banditry” pushing the world toward “chaos and lawlessness.”
With an assertive Israel and numerous local rivalries, the region is entering a year in which the cost of error is rising
Forecasting is a thankless business and often one that appears, at first glance, only partly rational. Yet it remains indispensable. Without an effort to look ahead, it is impossible to craft strategy or design public policy in a way that reduces information asymmetry and uncertainty.
In politics and economics, it is more accurate to speak not of “forecasts” in the strict sense, but of identifying trends when observing the behavior of key state and non-state actors. That is precisely the approach taken here, as we outline the main dynamics likely to shape the Middle East in 2026, taking into account national, regional, and global specificities.
One point is beyond dispute. The world is entering a phase of profound transformation, and 2026 is likely to deepen the atomization of the international community, accelerate the formation of macro-regions, and further dismantle the old world order, even as tentative contours of a new one begin to emerge. For the Middle East, however, this period will, regrettably, most likely bring a further intensification of confrontation and a steady buildup of conflict potential.
In 2026, the Israeli–Palestinian relationship will almost certainly remain the region’s principal source of tension. Instability will persist not only because of Gaza, where the ceasefire regime and the understandings reached remain fragile, but also because the conflict continues to reproduce itself across several fronts at once.
Gaza is not a closed chapter, but a constant stress test for the entire region’s security architecture. The most acute pressure point lies in the implementation of the agreement’s second phase, which envisages Hamas’s disarmament.
For Israel, this is framed as a necessary condition to prevent the reemergence of the threat. For Hamas, it is seen as the loss of a core instrument of survival and political leverage. This is precisely why the risk of collapse rises as the process moves into the second phase, as it demands decisions that are difficult to force through without triggering a domestic political crisis on both sides.
Israel’s internal dynamics will further amplify this fragility. The political crisis inside Israel is far from resolved, and the right-wing coalition led by Benjamin Netanyahu will continue to fight to retain power. Under such circumstances, the perception of an external threat becomes a convenient tool for mobilization and control, as it helps consolidate supporters and discipline coalition partners. External tension turns into an argument in domestic politics, and the space for flexible decision-making narrows.
The danger isn't confined to Gaza. The West Bank and East Jerusalem remain arenas where tension accumulates gradually, but systematically. The expansion of Israeli settlements and the shifting realities on the ground erode the very foundations of a potential political compromise. At the same time, the Palestinian National Authority is facing a crisis of legitimacy, while Mahmoud Abbas’s public standing has fallen to historic lows. This leaves the Palestinian leadership with ever less societal capital to take painful decisions, while Israel has ever fewer incentives to negotiate with a counterpart whose representativeness is increasingly questioned.
As a result, 2026 may reinforce a trend toward either a widening of open confrontation or the growth of large-scale, diffuse instability. Localized flare-ups, retaliatory operations, and a new wave of radicalization can easily spill beyond a single territory and spread across other parts of the Palestinian arena. Prospects for a settlement remain limited, especially as long as far-right forces retain a dominant position in power and shape an agenda in which compromise is treated as weakness rather than as an instrument of security.
The tensions associated with the rise of the far right in Israel will not be confined to the Palestinian track. They are increasingly projected onto neighboring theaters, above all Syria and Lebanon, where the logic of forceful dominance and the expansion of “security zones” may once again prevail over cautious diplomacy.
The Syrian theater remains particularly sensitive. Within Israel’s political and security establishment, a persistent deficit of trust toward the new authorities in Damascus endures, and it is not episodic but structural. The change of leadership in the capital is not seen as a guarantee of a transformed security environment. On the contrary, it is often interpreted as a temporary window of uncertainty that can be used to lock in advantages on the ground. In this frame, parts of Israel’s right view 2026 as a historic opportunity to expand control over border areas and increase strategic depth, while simultaneously advancing ideas such as the so-called “David Corridor.” In such a logic, emphasis is placed on leveraging Syria’s minorities, primarily the Druze and the Kurds, and at times even the Alawite factor, as elements in reshaping the local balance to serve broader strategic objectives.
Further complicating the Syrian issue is the growing rivalry between Israel and Türkiye. Ankara, as one of the key external pillars of Syria’s new authorities, is simultaneously expanding its regional political and military reach, which Israel increasingly reads as a strategic challenge. This emerging competition creates an environment in which any local incident can rapidly escalate into a hard-edged show of force, turning Syria once again into an arena not only for local factions, but for major regional power centers.
In 2026, Lebanon’s situation will remain equally complex and potentially explosive. The core issue has not changed – the fate of Hezbollah’s armed wing. Israel and the United States are intensifying pressure on the Shiite movement, viewing it as Iran’s principal proxy instrument and a direct threat to their security calculations. For Hezbollah itself, disarmament is not perceived as a compromise, but as political and military suicide, as it would mean relinquishing the main guarantee of influence and survival within Lebanon’s power system.
That is precisely why volatility in southern Lebanon could once again become the entry point for a broader escalation. Against the backdrop of sharper rhetoric and reciprocal strikes, the risk of a renewed Israeli incursion will rise, especially if Israel’s military leadership concludes that “temporary measures” no longer work.
Yet even a limited operation could set off a chain reaction – Lebanon’s economic exhaustion would deepen, political paralysis would harden, and the social fabric would fray further. In such circumstances, the country’s fragile ethno-confessional balance could begin to crack under the weight of crisis, pushing Lebanon closer to a scenario of internal conflict in which the boundary between an external war and domestic confrontation quickly blurs.
Another multi-layered arena of confrontation for Israel in 2026 will be its standoff with Iran, with the overall logic of events pointing not toward de-escalation, but toward further deterioration. This conflict operates on several levels at once – through direct coercive pressure, through proxy networks, and as an extension of domestic politics both in Israel and in Iran.
Late 2025 and early 2026 in Iran were marked by a new wave of protests that began amid worsening socio-economic conditions in several major cities and rapidly shifted into the political arena. Reports of a widening protest geography and rising tension appeared in international coverage and analytical assessments. Inside the country, the authorities typically interpret such surges not only as social discontent but also as an element of external interference, an assumption reinforced by previous, well-documented cases of outside actors seeking to shape protest dynamics. This hardens the state’s response and narrows the space for compromise. As a result, internal strain and external confrontation begin to feed one another, producing a closed cycle of escalation.
On the Israeli side, this dynamic is also embedded in domestic political logic. Netanyahu and his coalition, judging from their broader trajectory, are unlikely to lower the stakes regarding Iran in 2026. The image of Iran as an existential threat becomes a mobilizing instrument and an argument for forceful options, shifting the focus away from internal contradictions and toward a security-centered agenda.
Signals from Washington further reinforce the sense that coercive methods are once again being treated as an acceptable tool against regimes the US deems problematic. The Trump administration’s actions toward Venezuela and President Nicolás Maduro in early 2026 served, for Iran and the wider region, as a demonstration of readiness for hard-line scenarios and direct pressure.
For Tehran, this means that 2026 will bring rising external pressure alongside a renewed drive for internal mobilization. Iran’s authorities will seek to strengthen their defensive capabilities and consolidate public opinion around the imperative of protecting sovereignty, drawing on a “besieged fortress” narrative. In this context, an increasingly frequent argument is that the only truly effective instrument of deterrence under such conditions could be the possession of nuclear weapons.
The logic is straightforward – such a capability would raise the cost of a direct strike and thereby reduce the willingness of external actors to pursue a force-based scenario. At the same time, the element of nuclear ambiguity persists, and assessments by international bodies and experts emphasize that Iran’s stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and its enrichment capacity have shortened the timeline to a potential “breakout” in terms of fissile material, even if that is not equivalent to possessing a finished warhead and reliable delivery systems.
This is precisely where the most dangerous crossroads of 2026 emerges. Any movement toward a maximal level of strategic deterrence will inevitably undermine the region’s security architecture and raise the likelihood of Israel using force, with the US also at risk of being drawn in.
The Middle East already contains enough “dry tinder” – proxy networks, strikes on critical infrastructure, exchanges of missile and drone attacks, and mounting threats to maritime routes. In such an environment, a new round of direct Israel–Iran confrontation could quickly outgrow a bilateral duel and spread across multiple theaters at once, with consequences the region may not be able to absorb.
At the same time, competition among regional power centers will intensify in 2026, increasingly spilling beyond the economic sphere and taking on military and political dimensions in third-party arenas. One of the clearest examples is the deepening rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Not long ago it was largely framed as a dispute over development models and investment priorities, yet it is now expressed in clashing interests across crisis zones and in competing efforts to shape and discipline allied forces.
Yemen has become a showcase of this new reality. Late 2025 and the first days of 2026 were marked by renewed escalation in the south – clashes and rapid shifts on the ground, with forces linked to the Southern Transitional Council on one side and structures aligned with the internationally recognized Yemeni authorities, under Saudi patronage, on the other. International reporting has explicitly highlighted that the STC leans on Abu Dhabi’s support, while the official camp remains closer to Riyadh, and this very split is increasingly turning the Yemeni theater into an arena of intra-Gulf confrontation.
In parallel, the war in Sudan continues, and here too the competition of interests is acquiring a pronounced regional dimension. Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve its role as a mediator and an “anchor” for negotiations, including through the Jeddah track, while persistent allegations circulate concerning the UAE’s support for the RSF and its preference for building its own levers of influence in Sudan. In practice, this means the protracted conflict is fueled not only by internal dynamics, but also by external rivalry over access to resources, logistics corridors, and Sudan’s political future.
This fault line is visible more broadly as well – in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and other arenas where Gulf states are acting less in concert and increasingly through different local networks. The UAE, for its part, has been steadily constructing its own architecture of influence, relying on partnerships with states and proxy actors, which makes its course more autonomous and, in the eyes of some regional elites, more assertive.
An additional layer is Abu Dhabi’s deepening alignment with Israel. Since normalization, the relationship has developed a dense agenda of cooperation, including in security and intelligence. Against the backdrop of a stalled Saudi-Israeli normalization track, absent meaningful movement on the Palestinian issue, this quiet asymmetry in regional alignments becomes a source of irritation and strategic wariness for Riyadh.
At the same time, the contest for influence by the Ankara-Doha axis will also expand, as both seek to consolidate their positions amid regional and global uncertainty. Türkiye and Qatar consistently reaffirm the strategic nature of their partnership – through packages of agreements and coordination on key crises, including Gaza, as well as their involvement in Syria’s political and post-war reconstruction trajectories. In 2026, this does not necessarily imply open confrontation, but it does mean sharper competition among rival projects – each center of power pushing its own vision of regional order, while the collision of these visions becomes yet another amplifier of instability.
Against this backdrop of intensifying regional rivalry, escalation in ongoing conflicts in 2026 looks more like the rule than the exception. Sudan and Libya are particularly illustrative, because both crises have long since moved beyond purely domestic fault lines and are increasingly shaped by the external environment – by money, logistics, and the backing of patrons, as well as by how neighboring actors redistribute influence.
Sudan remains a war with no visible horizon for resolution. Late 2025 brought yet another intensification of fighting and shifts on the front lines, while the humanitarian situation has slipped into chronic catastrophe, where even temporary lulls do not translate into relief for civilians. The central problem for 2026 is that the conflict is sustained not only by the SAF-RSF rivalry, but also by the widening competition of external actors who view Sudan as a space in which to place strategic bets on the future. Under these conditions, diplomatic formulas stall, the parties place their faith not in compromise but in wearing the other down, and 2026 is therefore more likely to be a year of further fragmentation and rising violence than one of stabilization.
Libya is moving along a similar trajectory, albeit in a different form. Front lines do not always resemble trenches, yet political deadlock continues to corrode the state from within. Parallel centers of legitimacy endure, and real leverage often remains in the hands of armed groups. The UN Security Council and diplomats have repeatedly warned that the status quo is becoming ever less sustainable, and the absence of progress deepens instability and erodes trust.
The risk of a renewed cycle of armed competition around Tripoli, meanwhile, has not disappeared. The capital already experienced major clashes in the spring of 2025, and the country’s economic institutions remain vulnerable to pressure from armed actors. The external dimension adds further fuel, as different regional powers continue to back different Libyan camps, turning an internal crisis into an arena of competing projects, where politics is invariably underwritten by force.
Another factor that will continue to shape the region’s high potential for instability in 2026 is domestic politics. Socio-economic strain and political crises inside Middle Eastern and North African states will directly shape foreign-policy agendas, increasing the likelihood of abrupt decisions and risky bets, especially where ruling elites must simultaneously preserve governability and project strength.
Türkiye is, in this sense, one of the most illustrative cases. The country enters 2026 with a continuing pattern of economic turbulence, in which tight monetary policy and expensive credit weigh on growth, the labor market, and public sentiment. Even senior figures from major state institutions have publicly warned that a prolonged period of high financing costs could become one of the central challenges for the economy and the financial sector in 2026. International assessments, meanwhile, remain cautious in their expectations for inflation and growth, which means households and businesses are likely to continue operating under a persistent sense of instability.
This economic strain is compounded by sharp political polarization. The confrontation between the governing coalition and the opposition is gradually shifting from electoral competition into legal and institutional conflict. Legal pressure on the Republican People’s Party, detentions and investigations targeting opposition figures, and high-profile cases involving Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu have become key indicators of how intensely the domestic contest has escalated. As a result, Türkiye’s foreign policy in 2026 is set to become even more dependent on internal dynamics, as external crises can serve as convenient instruments of consolidation and any concessions abroad may be framed as weakness in the context of domestic rivalry.
Syria remains the second major locus of internal vulnerability, where socio-economic devastation and ethno-confessional fragmentation continue to feed the risk of renewed violence. The scale of post-war economic and infrastructural degradation is such that, even with a relative decline in fighting, the country remains trapped in chronic instability, while reconstruction costs are widely estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars. The political landscape is multi-layered, as trust among communities has been severely eroded and efforts at centralization face resistance from local actors, alongside unresolved questions over territorial control and armed groups.
For President Ahmed al-Sharaa, 2025 was indeed marked by energetic external diplomacy and attempts to position Syria within regional and global configurations of power. Yet the domestic foundation remains far too fragile. Agreements reached at the top do not automatically translate into trust on the ground, and without rebuilding basic socio-economic structures ensuring well-being, it will be exceedingly difficult to construct sustainable relations among Syria’s ethno-confessional groups. Under such conditions, the risk of a relapse into internal conflict persists, even if it does not initially take the form of a full-scale war, but rather a chain of localized crises that gradually erode the state’s governability.
Egypt enters 2026 as a buffer state, compelled to manage external fires while preserving internal resilience. On its eastern flank, the continuing crisis around Gaza makes Cairo an indispensable mediator and a critical gateway for humanitarian channels, yet the humanitarian architecture itself is becoming more fragile as access rules tighten and restrictions on international organizations expand, increasing the burden on Egypt and complicating risk management along the border.
To the south, Sudan’s protracted war will continue to pressure Egypt’s security and social sphere through displacement flows and humanitarian spillovers, as large numbers of displaced people remain in neighboring countries, including Egypt. To the west, Libya remains a persistent concern, as instability and the fragmentation of armed groups keep the border a conduit for threats ranging from smuggling to cross-border crime. This entire perimeter is further complicated by the Red Sea dimension, where risks to shipping translate directly into pressure on the Suez Canal and, by extension, one of Egypt’s most important sources of national revenue.
Domestically, these external pressures sit atop an economy that remains the main constraint on Cairo’s political room for maneuver. In 2025 the authorities continued along the reform track linked to the IMF program and raised fuel prices as part of a broader effort to reduce subsidies, a move that feeds directly into public sentiment and the cost of living. At the same time, Egypt is critically dependent on hard currency inflows, which means that any renewed surge of tension in the Red Sea and any drop in Suez transit becomes not merely a foreign-policy problem, but a macroeconomic shock with immediate implications for the budget and stability.
In 2026, Egypt’s foreign policy is therefore likely to be shaped ever more by an “economy of survival” – the imperative to minimize regional turbulence, keep borders under control, and extract maximum diplomatic dividends from its status as an indispensable actor at the intersection of Gaza, Sudan, Libya, and maritime trade routes.
In sum, 2026 is highly likely to entrench the Middle East’s dominant trend of recent years – the erosion of established frameworks alongside a steady multiplication of flashpoints that no longer exist in isolation. The region is entering a year in which conflicts increasingly function as a system of communicating vessels. Escalation in one arena almost automatically raises pressure in another, while the interlinkage of crises makes familiar de-escalation mechanisms less effective.
The Israeli-Palestinian confrontation will continue to set the emotional and political tone for the wider region, and Israel’s concurrent lines of confrontation on the Syrian, Lebanese, and Iranian tracks will reinforce the sense that security is once again being defined not by rules, but by the balance of power. At the same time, competition among regional actors – above all within the Gulf and around the Ankara-Doha axis – will be expressed ever more actively in third-party arenas, from Yemen to Sudan and beyond, turning local conflicts into battlegrounds for competing projects and influence.
Meanwhile, domestic crises across the region will amplify overall conflict potential. Socio-economic strain, polarization, and crises of legitimacy push elites toward harder choices and narrow the space for compromise. When internal stability becomes a matter of political survival, foreign policy inevitably acquires a mobilizational tone, and geopolitics begins to serve domestic imperatives. That is why the decisive factor in 2026 will be less the emergence of entirely new conflicts than the capacity of existing crises to expand and intertwine, producing a chain-reaction effect.
Under such conditions, the most realistic strategy for regional and external actors alike will be risk management and the prevention of major ruptures – by strengthening channels of communication, reducing the likelihood of inadvertent escalation, and building at least minimal economic “cushions” capable of softening social shocks. The overall trajectory, however, remains troubling. The region is entering a year in which the cost of error is rising, while the window for durable stabilization remains narrow.
The US space agency is now “evaluating” opportunities for an earlier launch to replace the crew
The SpaceX Crew-11 mission to the International Space Station (ISS) will be cut short and the astronauts will return to Earth ahead of schedule, as one of them needs medical care, NASA Director Jared Isaacman has announced.
The four-person team has been conducting research aboard the ISS since August and had been expected to remain until next month, following a handover period after the arrival of the Crew-12 mission.
“Yesterday, January 7th, a single crew member on board the station experienced a medical situation and is now stable,” NASA Director Jared Isaacman said in a briefing on Thursday.
“I’ve come to the decision that it’s in the best interest of our astronauts to return Crew-11 ahead of their planned departure,” he said, without elaborating which team member had the medical issue, citing privacy concerns.
NASA Chief Health and Medical Officer Dr. J.D. Polk noted that “this is not an emergent evacuation,” but said that the agency wanted to use its “full suite” of medical equipment to diagnose the astronaut once they return to Earth.
According to Isaacman, the US agency is currently “evaluating their timeline” for earlier launch opportunities for the Crew-12 mission, which had been scheduled for mid-February.
The Crew-11 members – Roscosmos cosmonaut Oleg Platonov, NASA astronauts Zena Cardman and Mike Fincke and Japan’s Kimiya Yui – are expected to splash down off the coast of California on Thursday, pending favorable weather conditions, the US space agency said.
In the meantime, the ISS will be maintained by Russian cosmonauts Sergey Kud-Sverchkov and Sergei Mikaev, as well as NASA astronaut Chris Williams, who launched to the station aboard the Russian Soyuz MS-28 in November.
Roscosmos and NASA agreed to extend space cooperation and joint operations aboard the ISS in July, ahead of the Crew-11 mission’s launch.
The space station, the largest ever built, has orbited our planet since 1998. It has continued to serve as a unique international scientific research platform despite years of political tensions over the Ukraine conflict.
Indonesia has temporarily restricted access to xAI’s flagship chatbot amid growing criticism
Indonesia has blocked Elon Musk’s Grok AI over growing concerns that the chatbot facilitates the creation of deepfake pornographic content.
The move by the country’s Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs makes the Southeast Asian nation the first to temporarily ban access to the AI tool.
Grok has come under scrutiny globally after reports emerged that the chatbot can generate erotic deepfakes from photographs, including images of minors. Some regulators have since opened inquiries into sexualized content produced by the app, which was developed by xAI.
Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, enforces strict rules banning material deemed to be obscene.
“The government views non-consensual sexual deepfakes as a serious violation of human rights, dignity, and citizens’ security in the digital space,” Communication and Digital Affairs Minister Meutya Hafid said, describing the misuse of AI to create fake pornography as a form of “digital-based violence.”
Hafid added that Grok’s future in Indonesia, one of the world’s largest social media markets, will depend on X’s willingness to implement robust content filters and adhere to ethical AI standards. Officials from X have been summoned for talks.
On Thursday, the European Commission ordered X to preserve all documents and data related to the Grok chatbot until the end of 2026. The precautionary move, taken under the EU’s Digital Services Act, is intended to prevent the loss of evidence amid concerns over potentially illegal content.
In the UK, The Telegraph reported earlier this week that X could face a possible block over pornographic content generated by Grok. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has reportedly referred the issue to media regulator Ofcom, with options said to include a full ban.
Earlier this month, French prosecutors opened a probe into the alleged spread of sexually explicit deepfakes generated by Grok after hundreds of people reported their photos had been digitally “undressed.”
Musk’s AI venture has faced mounting controversy since the launch of Grok 4 in July 2025, with critics pointing to extremist rhetoric, a political bias and sexualized features as evidence of inadequate safeguards. Experts warn that poorly moderated AI tools risk exposing users, particularly children, to harmful content.
Finnish officials have sounded the alarm about the “Russian threat,” with Moscow denying it has plans to attack Western countries
Finland on Saturday officially withdrew from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines amid tensions with Russia over the Ukraine conflict.
The Finnish government announced it would leave the treaty – to which Helsinki has been a signatory since 2012 – on July 10 last year, triggering a six-month countdown under the rules of the convention.
In June, Finnish President Alexander Stubb argued that the country faces “an aggressive, imperialist state” as a neighbor, while Defense Minister Antti Hakkanen said that “protection against the Russian threat takes priority.” Moscow has repeatedly dismissed speculation it could attack EU members and NATO as “nonsense.”
When Helsinki – along with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – announced the decision, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called the development “troubling,” urging states to uphold humanitarian disarmament commitments and warning that anti-personnel mines pose long-term dangers to civilians even after wars end.
The Ottawa Convention, adopted in 1997, bans the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines because of their indiscriminate impact. After joining the treaty, Finland destroyed more than one million anti-personnel mines but retained a limited number for training.
Finland’s relations with Moscow frayed significantly after the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022. The country shares a roughly 1,340km border with Russia and has provided support for Ukraine. It joined NATO in April 2023, ending a decades-long neutrality policy.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has said that Moscow previously had “no problems at all” with Finland and Sweden – which also decided to join NATO – adding that companies from both countries “received dividends and benefits from this cooperation.” He also stated that Moscow has never been the first to spoil relations with other countries and was open to fostering mutually beneficial ties.
The French opposition demands that the president’s plan be endorsed by the UN, according to the newspaper
President Emmanuel Macron has briefed France’s main political forces on plans to send troops to Ukraine after a potential ceasefire, but has run into opposition from across the political spectrum, Le Monde reported on Friday.
Several parties reportedly insisted that any deployment must be endorsed by the United Nations – something which is unlikely to happen due to Russia’s opposition to the plan and its UN Security Council veto.
According to Le Monde, Macron on Thursday held a three-hour gathering of around 30 participants, including leaders from Marine Le Pen’s right-wing National Rally and left-wing La France Insoumise.
Macron’s team reportedly shared “confidential details” on the French contribution to troop deployment, with La France Insoumise leader Mathilde Panot telling Le Monde that Paris could send as many as 6,000 troops.
During the briefing, General Fabien Mandon reportedly told participants that French troops would act not as a “stabilization” contingent but rather as a “reassurance” force “far from the front.”
While the French politicians did not object to the idea in principle, the details of the plan drew a lot of skepticism. Representatives of La France Insoumise and the French Communist Party insisted that the force should be supported by a UN mandate, a demand echoed by Le Pen. The latter also voiced concern about potential US participation in the plan, noting that Washington has lost a lot of credibility after its attack on Venezuela.
Securing a UN mandate would likely prove difficult, as Russia holds the power to veto any resolution authorizing foreign troop deployments.
The closed-door meeting comes after the UK and France signed a “declaration of intent” with Kiev to deploy forces and establish “military hubs” in Ukraine “in the event of a peace deal” with Moscow.
Russia has long opposed the plan, warning that it would treat any Western military in the neighboring country as “legitimate targets.” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova also said that the declaration is aimed “at continued militarization, escalation, and further aggravation of the conflict” while jeopardizing Moscow’s security interests.
After raiding Venezuela and kidnapping its president Nicolas Maduro, Washington has repeated threats to annex Greenland
The US is increasingly distancing itself from some of its allies and retreating from international rules, French President Emmanuel Macron said on Thursday. The comment comes a week after Washington conducted a military raid on Venezuela and threatened once again to annex Denmark’s autonomous territory of Greenland.
Earlier this month, American commandos carried out a series of airstrikes on the Venezuelan capital, Caracas, and several other regions of the country, while abducting President Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores. US President Donald Trump on Friday told journalists that a military option was on the table regarding Greenland, which he claimed would be taken over by China or Russia if Washington did not act.
“We are evolving in a world of great powers, with a real temptation to divide up the world among them,” Macron said in his annual speech to French ambassadors commenting on the latest developments.
“The US has an established power, but one that is gradually turning away from some of its allies and freeing itself from international rules that it was still promoting not so long ago – whether in the field of trade or certain elements of security,” the French leader highlighted.
Macron also said that France and the EU are currently “facing neo-colonial aggression” while being “subjected to anti-colonial rhetoric that no longer corresponds to reality.”
Trump has sought outright ownership of Greenland since his first term, stressing that the island is vital to Arctic security. The claims have become a major source of tension between Washington and European NATO members.
On Monday, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said a US annexation of Greenland would effectively signal the end of NATO. The leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the UK later joined her in a statement saying that the island “belongs to its people.”
On Friday, Trump said he would like to go the “easy way” regarding Greenland. He did not rule out paying Greenlanders when asked about compensation, but stressed that Washington would “do it the hard way” if necessary.
The US will take certain measures regarding the island “whether they like it or not,” the president has said
US President Donald Trump has warned that Washington could obtain Greenland the “hard way,” saying he would not allow the strategic North Atlantic island to fall prey to Russia or China. The Kingdom of Denmark, which holds sovereignty over Greenland, has opposed the US push to acquire the island.
Speaking to reporters at the White House on Friday, Trump said that the US is “going to do something on Greenland whether they like it or not,” arguing that “Russia or China will take over Greenland” if Washington does not act.
“I would like to make a deal, you know, the easy way. But if we don’t do it the easy way, we’re going to do it the hard way,” he stressed, without elaborating on how far he was ready to go. Trump, who has acknowledged that a military option is on the table, also did not rule out paying Greenlanders when asked about compensating residents.
Greenland is an autonomous Danish territory with a population of less than 57,000 despite being larger than Mexico, and the US already has a military presence there. However, Trump has sought to establish outright control, stressing that the island is vital to Arctic security.
The Greenland saga, which first caught the spotlight during Trump’s first term, has become a major source of tension between the US and European NATO members.Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has warned that any US military attack on another NATO country would mean “everything stops,” while leaders in Europe have stressed that “Greenland belongs to its people.”
On Tuesday, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration would prefer to buy Greenland as opposed to using any coercive measures. Reuters reported that the US was mulling a plan to send each Greenlander between $10,000 and $100,000 to convince them to support America’s bid, with the specifics of the procedure unclear.
Given that the population is so small, this works out to less than six billion dollars if every resident, regardless of age, receives the maximum compensation.
Every year, Denmark already provides Greenland with a 'block grant' to cover essential costs, which works out to nearly $11,200 (€10,000) per person. Additionally, in September 2025, a landmark agreement was signed where Copenhagen took over the costs of Greenlandic patients requiring specialized treatment in Danish hospitals.
As things stand, polling suggests little appetite in Greenland for becoming part of the US. A January 2025 poll by Greenlandic newspaper Sermitsiaq and research firm Verian found that about 85% of respondents opposed joining the US, while only around 6% supported the idea.
The US president has claimed that the country is run by cartels
US President Donald Trump has signaled that he could order strikes against drug cartels on Mexican territory.
He renewed the threats against America’s southern neighbor after US commandos abducted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro during a lightning raid on his compound in Caracas last week. The US government accuses Maduro of narcotics trafficking, which he has denied.
Trump has also accused Mexico of “flooding” the US with drugs and illegal immigrants, many of whom he has described as violent criminals. Since September 2025, the US has struck at least 35 alleged cartel boats in the Caribbean.
“We’ve knocked out 97% of the drugs coming in by water, and we are going to start now hitting land with regard to the cartels,” Trump told Fox News’ Sean Hannity on Thursday night.
“The cartels are running Mexico. It’s very, very sad to watch and see what’s happened to that country,” Trump said.
Speaking at a press conference on Friday, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum downplayed Trump’s rhetoric as “part of his communication style.”
She added that she had instructed Mexican Foreign Minister Juan Ramon de la Fuente to speak with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and, “if necessary, with Trump to strengthen coordination.”
Last week, the Mexican Foreign Ministry condemned the US military raid in Venezuela as “a serious threat to regional stability.”
Following the abduction of Maduro, Trump also traded insults with Colombian President Gustavo Petro, whom he labeled a “sick man.” The leaders spoke by phone on Wednesday to defuse tensions, with both describing the conversation as cordial.
Russia has warned that Western soldiers there would be treated as legitimate targets
The UK will spend nearly $270 million on equipping troops it plans to deploy in Ukraine after a ceasefire is reached, British Defense Secretary John Healey announced during a trip to Kiev on Friday.
Russia has repeatedly said it would not allow Western soldiers to be stationed in Ukraine and has warned that it would treat foreign troops as legitimate targets.
Nevertheless, Healey said the funds would be invested in units intended to form part of a multinational force aimed at providing “long-term security guarantees” to Ukraine.
“We are surging investment into our preparations following the prime minister’s announcement this week, ensuring that Britain’s Armed Forces are ready to deploy and lead the Multinational Force Ukraine, because a secure Ukraine means a secure UK,” Healey said.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Denis Shmigal said after the meeting that the UK would begin producing 1,000 Octopus interceptor drones per month in February and deliver them to Ukraine.
Despite their continued support for military aid, some European countries, including Germany and Italy, have refused to commit to sending troops to the country.
NATO members Hungary and Slovakia have declined to send weapons to Kiev, urging the West to focus on diplomacy instead. The US, which has been attempting to mediate a truce between Russia and Ukraine, has also ruled out sending American soldiers to the country.
The Russian Foreign Ministry reiterated on Thursday that Moscow would treat “the stationing of military units, sites, depots and other Western infrastructure in Ukraine as a foreign intervention posing a direct threat to Russia’s security.”
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